). Multivariate refutation of aetiological hypotheses in non-experimental epidemiology. Internationa/Journal of Epidemiology 1990,19: 782-787. Extension of Karl Popper's logic of refutation from the realm of contingency tables to multivariate modelling leads to the conclusion that rigorously scientific multivariate analysis in non-experimental epidemiology differs from the traditional quasi-scientific approach. Instead of aiming for high sensitivity in detecting aetiological agents, the goal in refutation is high specificity-to give the best defence of the 'innocence' of every exposure hypothesized as being a cause. Instead of 'forward selection' or 'backward elimination', multivariate refutation uses the method of 'forward elimination'. This entails a likelihood approach (which may be complemented by, but should be demarcated from, Bayesian methods) not only for statistical inference but also, by analogy, for study design and conduct: one starts with the conclusion (the estimate or hypothesis) and works backwards to the observations (the likelihood of the data or the design of the study). Differences in practice can sometimes be large, as illustrated by a study of hypothesized triggers of myocardial infarction. Multivariate refutation should replace the concept of multivariate modelling in non-experimental epidemiology.
Multivariate analysis in non-experimental epidemiology can be rigorously scientific, quasi-scientific, pseudo-scientific or unscientific. Traditional procedures of multivariate modelling of the correlates of disease occurrence are quasi-scientific because they do not conform rigorously to the logic of refutation. To be rigorously scientific, it is best to discard the concept of multivariate modelling and replace it with the concept of multivariate refutation.
STRATIFIED ANALYSIS
The logical basis of multivariate refutation can be seen most clearly by relating simple propositions of categorical logic to a stratified contingency table. As well as inventing the algebra of logic, Boole introduced the contingency table (the 'truth table') as a tool of categorical logic' The proposition 'If P then Q', which is equivalent to 'If P then no instances of not Q-occur', can be written as a 2 x 2 table with a zero in the cell for co-occurrence of P and not-Q. 2J 'If P then Q' is a statement of association, not of causality. We can hypothesize four types of causal explanation: (1) P causes Q; (2) Q causes P; (3) a confounding factor, C, causes both P and Q; and (4) the multifacHarvard School of Public Health, Department of Epidemiology, 677 Huntington Avenue, Boston. MA 02115. USA. torial mechanisms that produce P and Q share no component cause that is sufficiently deterministic to cause a reproducible association of P and Q, but the co-occurrence of P and Q nevertheless has occurred owing to an unpredictable irreproducible coincidence of quirks in their separate causal mechanisms (ie 'due to chance ') . Of course, mixtures of these four explanations are possible, including a hybrid of (3) and (4) in which the multifactorial mechanisms producing P and Q share one or more weakly deterministic component causes. Usually superimposed on this are the causal processes used in studies-selection and measurement-but we will ignore them for the moment. For the purpose of illustrating logic, we will assume a full census of the base population and perfect measurement.
To progress from a statement of association to inference about causality, it is necessary to rule out (refute) competing hypotheses. 3 
"
5 If Q never precedes P, then we can rule out explanation 2, because effects cannot precede causes (at least in simple systems without feedback loops). We can rule out explanation 4 (the causal explanation that goes with the null hypothesis) by repeatedly observing the same population or other similar populations, or by studying one very large population. That leaves us with explanations 1 and 3.
Explanation 3 can be ruled out by random allocation of subjects to P and not-P, ensuring a balance of C between subgroups. But in a non-experimental setting, innumerable known and unknown potential confounders remain associated with P. Therefore, the number of refutations required to prove explanation 1 is indeterminate. This is the fundamental problem of causal inference in non-experimental studies.
6 To acknowledge it, the word 'corroborate' is used instead of 'prove' to mean increasing evidence consistent with the hypothesis of interest and relatively inconsistent with competing hypotheses. Since conclusive disproof is also unattainable (because of the possibility of negative confounding, measurement error and bias in study design and execution), 'refutation' is used instead of 'falsification' to mean increasing evidence inconsistent with the hypothesis.
To corroborate explanation 1, it is necessary to refute hypothesized confounding. This can be done by showing 'If C and not-P, then not-Q', which requires dividing the data into P and not-P, and finding zero instances of the co-occurrence of C and Q in the not-P stratum. Such is the deductive logic underlying stratified analysis.
REFUTATION BY PURIFICATION
The same deductive logic is used by laboratory scientists when they purify mixtures to identify aetiological agents: they separate the impure mixture, P-and-C, into two fractions, P-and-not-C and C-andnot-P, and measure the amount of Q produced by each fraction. If they are lucky, they find Q is not produced by one of the fractions; then it is easy to deduce which is not the aetiological agent. If they are unlucky, and Q is produced by both fractions, they must further purify the fractions to generate a control fraction, not-P-andnot-C, and contrast its production of Q with that of the fractions containing P or C.
Stratification of populations is directly analogous to purification. If an epidemiologist is lucky, a subgroup of the population exposed to hypothesized confounder C, but not P, is found to have zero cases of illness. (Of course, zero cells occur by chance in small studies with fine stratification, but we will assume that the study is large and explanation 4 has been ruled out.) For example, in the early phase of the AIDS epidemic, it was noted that ten-year-old children in Africa, who were exposed to mosquitoes but presumably no sexual activity, did not develop AIDS. Therefore mosquito transmission of AIDS could be ruled out. This is as close to categorical logic as epidemiology gets. It requires no quantitative skills, just an active mind to generate hypotheses and make deductions.
Quantitative epidemiological methods are needed in the much more common 'impure' situation when disease Q does occur in the subgroup exposed to hypothesized confounder C and not P. The control group, not-P-and-not-C, is used to deduce whether additional cases of Q-more observed than expected-occur in subgroups P-and-not-C or C-andnot-P. (So as not to waste data, the subgroup P-and-C is also contrasted with P-and-not-C and with C-andnot-P.) The epidemiological measures of association used to make these contrasts are thus tools of quantitative deductive logic. They are needed when cells with zeros do not occur, ie when multiple causes of Q exist. More precisely, the contrast between observed and expected numbers of cases (expressed as a ratio, a difference, or a related statistic), after stratifying for alternative explanatory variables, is the principal basis for deductive inference about multifactorial mechanisms of disease.
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Multivariate analysis employs the same logic. The addition of a term to a multivariate model is equivalent to an additional stratification of the data and re-estimation of the effect measure, which is analogous to a laboratory scientist's additional purification of a mixture and assay of its fractions. Each of these steps should be considered a distinct 'experiment' a separate test of competing hypotheses.
Any such test is not simply scientific or unscientific, however. There are degrees of 'scientific rigor'. The rigor of a test is the degree to which it permits discrimination among competing hypotheses. Consequently, epidemiologists are more rigorous the more they are cognizant of the goal of refuting competing hypotheses when studies are designed, when data are collected, and when variables are defined, transformed and selected for analysis. The same is true for laboratory scientists: awareness of potential impurities and flaws in procedures is what distinguishes good from bad laboratory science.
Unscientific multivariate analysis is multivariate modelling without the possibility or pretence of explanation. For example, the author contributed to a paper 7 presenting stratified analyses of data on possible triggers of myocardial infarction (MI), based on a 'hypothesis generating question' that had been added as an afterthought to a questionnaire in a randomized trial. Like journalism and anecdotal case reports, the paper was neither meaningless nor useless, but the analysis was unscientific according to Popper' s criterion of falsifiability:
3 the data allowed for no refutation of several obvious alternative explanations because there were no controls. Multivariate modelling was possible but would not have increased our capacity for scientific inference.
Pseudo-scientific multivanate analysis is multivariate modelling to support a particular viewpoint by using methods that appear to be scientific. Gould, in The Mismeasure of Man* cites examples of pseudoscience in support of prejudices about genetic inheritance and human intelligence. The classic book, How to Lie with Statistics, 9 focused on simple statistical methods; a second volume could be written on multivanate methods. Among the infinite number of data subsets and regroupings within datasets, and the infinite number of mathematical models, it is possible to find some combination to support almost any prejudice. Without openness to alternative hypotheses and suppression of personal prejudices, multivanate modelling is pseudo-science.
Quasi-scientific multivariate analysis employs 'forward selection ' and/or 'backward elimination' 10 of variables representing competing hypotheses, with the goal of producing a multivariate model that is the best description of the data. Such an analysis, although meaningful and widely used by epidemiologists, does not conform rigorously to the logic of refutation. Consider, for example, a study of coffee in relation to MI in which smoking was controlled using only a crude categorical variable." The authors may have chosen broad categories so the confidence intervals would be narrower for each of the smoking variables. The drawback is incomplete control of confounding by smoking, ie a weaker test of the coffee hypothesis.
12
Rigorously scientific multivariate analysis employs 'forward elimination'. Terms representing competing hypotheses are added, as in 'forward selection', but they are defined, transformed and selected not according to their own significance but according to their ability to explain away (eliminate) the association of primary interest. Thus a multivariate analysis of the coffee hypothesis would begin with the crude association between coffee drinking and MI, and would examine its decay or survival as terms for multiple levels of current smoking, past smoking, age, alcohol intake, exercise and obesity are added.
An example of the use of forward elimination is a case-control study of beta-blockers and the prevention of coronary heart disease. ' 3 Table 4 in the report shows that, for non-fatal MI, the estimate of the exposure odds ratio went from a crude value of 0.50 (95% confidence interval: 0.32-0.78) to 0.62 (95% CI: 0.40-0.99) when adjusted for number of pharmacy visits, to 0.65 (95% CI: 0.40-1.05) when also adjusted for age, sex, smoking and year of presentation, and back to 0.60 (95% CI: 0.37-0.97) when also adjusted for cholesterol, family history and physical activity. The investigators used several methods of adjusting for number of pharmacy visits but the inverse association persisted.
Another example is a cross-sectional study of lead exposure and children's intellectual performance (IQ).
14 Table 3 in the report shows the crude inverse relation between tooth lead level and child's IQ was reduced by 60% after sequential addition of hypothesized confounders to the regression model. The table allows the reader to form an independent impression of how much further the association would have been weakened if mother's IQ and quality of marital relations (the main predictors of child IQ) could have been measured more precisely.
The goal of multivariate refutation is not a single multivariate aetiological model, but a description of the decay or survival of a hypothesis over a course of tests against competing explanations. Of course, this begs the question how to draw conclusions that will guide public health policy. Here is where Bayesian methods of quantitative reasoning are put to good use. However, clear demarcation should be maintained between the analytical process of refutation and the synthetic process of judgement. The importance of this subtle distinction can be illustrated by an analogy.
JUDICIAL ANALOGY When a crime is committed, one can arrest people at random, go through the motions of a trial, and convict whoever was most closely associated with the crime (the unscientific approach). Alternatively, one can arrest people according to prejudice, stage a kangaroo court using selective evidence in support of the prosecution, and convict whoever has the most evidence against them (the pseudo-scientific approach). The quasi-scientific approach is to arrest everyone who qualifies as a suspect, and to convict whoever has the most evidence against them, with the proviso that the evidence must be substantial. Common to all these approaches is the goal that someone must be blamed, although the quasi-scientific approach acknowledges that blame sometimes cannot be established conclusively.
None of these approaches meets modern standards of justice. Underlying those standards is a very different goal: better ten guilty go free than even one innocent be wrongly convicted. 15 To meet these standards, criteria for arrest, indictment and conviction must be made more specific, often at the expense of sensitivity, so as to reduce the frequency of false positives. Favouring the defendant means greater delay and expense, and fewer convictions of the guilty. But, in the long run, the judicial system is the better for it: prejudices are more effectively suppressed, and evidence is sought and used with greater vigour and rigor.
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PRINCIPLES OF MULTIVARIATE REFUTATION
To do justice to a causal hypothesis, the epidemiologist must adhere to the logic of multivariate refutation. This demands a distinctive research strategy that can be summarized by three maxims.
Focus on One Hypothesis at a Time
Report the crude association of interest, then try to explain it away by doing the following: Look at the raw data for outliers. Assess selection bias.
16 Force into the model variables for possible confounders. Assess the impact of error in measuring confounders. 17 Question model assumptions; try additive, multiplicative and mixed models. ' 8 Examine dose-response using nonordered categorical variables.' 8 ' 9 Formulate rebuttals: Try to explain away the competing explanations. Consider negative confounding, preVentive factors, and the obscuring effect of adjusting for misclassified variables. 17 This is tactically identical to the change-in-estimate method of variable selection in multivariate modelling, 18 but strategically different. The goal is not a single model but a description of how the hypothesis stood up under various assumptions. For this type of analysis to be optimal, it must be anticipated during study design.
Work Backwards from Conclusion (Hypothesis) to Data
For statistical inference, use the likelihood approach: 2 " start from alternative hypothesized estimates and compute the relative likelihood of data rather than attempting to move from the data straight to an estimate. Extend this to the design and conduct of the study: (a) anticipate alternative causal conclusions that you might make in your paper and the criticisms you might receive; (b) translate these statements into quantitative relationships, predicted effect measures, and hypothetical tables of data needed to refute or corroborate competing views; (c) do 'thought experiments' and simulations on alternative results of your future multivariate analyses; (d) imagine procedures for collecting data needed for such analyses and biases that might occur; (e) design study-populations and instruments that avoid or measure these biases. Thus the refutationist does not aim to collect data that is later modelled and interpreted, but rather creates interpretations that are then translated into models and tested by designed observations.
Greenland wrote 'Popperians need to develop their own general criteria for determining when a particular observation contradicts or corroborates a given epidemiologic theory'. 21 The criteria already exist, if one adds to his statement the phrase 'relative to an alternative theory or set of hypotheses'. This is how a Popperian wpuld view the problem. The criteria are relative likelihood methods. They quantify the relative propensities of a population to produce the observed data, given various alternative hypotheses concerning the mechanisms of disease causation and of subject selection and observation. The tasks of modifying belief and making choices among policies is a separate problem requiring additional (Bayesian) criteria.
Minimize the Role of Belief
Subjective probability is an anathema to Popper, 22 but I hold it is possible to be Popperian-Bayesian. Bayesian methods extend modelling to encompass the modelling of beliefs, and how beliefs change with new data. 20 However, like the problem of confounding, the influence of subjective beliefs on interpreting associations is not necessarily solved by modelling it. Just as it is desirable to prevent confounding whenever you can, likewise you should always try to minimize the influence of subjectivity. Whenever possible, try several alternatives (eg two control groups, alternative measures of exposure, different model assumptions) instead of deciding in favour of one or the other on the basis of your beliefs. Robins and Greenland 6 have shown that Bayesian reasoning leads logically to agnosticism in the analysis of non-experimental studies. They conclude that sensitivity analysis is the only rational response to the inevitable uncertainty. I suggest these sensitivity analyses should be guided by the logic of refutation and kept as separate as possible from the synthesis of judgement. Sensitivity analysis entails suppressing prejudice and asking yourself how you would view a problem differently if you had different beliefs. A Popperian-Bayesian would do sensitivity analyses of hypotheses, with prior probabilities and hypothetical data, as part of study design.
EXAMPLE
Unfortunately most of the discussion about the place of refutation in epidemiology has been largely abstract. 3 " 573 " 27 The reader is entitled to ask for a real example of multivariate refutation leading to a substantial difference in practice.
A good example is a study to test the hypotheses that MI can be triggered by physical activity, emotional stress, smoking, and coffee drinking, which my colleagues and I are conducting. We might have mindlessly used a conventional case-control design with both hospital or neighbourhood controls and 'let the data speak for themselves'. Instead, taking a refutationist approach, we grappled for a long time with various hypotheses concerning selection bias and information bias. Working backward from hypothetical results, we considered and then ruled out several non-MI control groups. Eventually we settled on the use of cases as their own controls. From this evolved a novel design-the case-crossover study (which resembles a set of retrospective cohort studies, each with sample size n=l, in which subjects cross in and out of periods of transiently elevated risk).
28
Next we made every effort to anticipate the final multivariate analyses while designing the questionnaire. Data from the pilot phase were analysed 28 to help us identify technical problems. The problems of selection bias, information bias and confounding were evaluated, and solutions developed, for each hypothesis separately. Had we taken a less rigorous approach, we would not have discovered until too late that assessment of dose-response and interaction among hypothesized triggers was impossible using early versions of the questionnaire. For these purposes, the case-crossover design requires meticulous attention to timing of exposures.
In addition, we deliberately entertained ideas contrary to our beliefs about the expected magnitudes of associations, induction periods, effect periods, 28 biases, and confounding. We found this influenced our choice of wording for questions and selection of subjects. For example, if we anticipated a strong association with physical activity, then we preferred a sensitive measure of exposure, able to separate the moderately active from the sedentary subjects. It would give a better estimate of aetiological fraction. If we expected a weak association, however, then we preferred a measure of physical activity with greater specificity, able to separate the vigorously from the moderately active. This was because, for rare exposures in case-control studies, increased specificity means greater resistance to non-differential misclassification bias.
In summary, our multivariate refutation began five years before its projected completion with a series of 'thought experiments' using hypothetical data and hypothetical tests of competing explanations. Although this example is atypical because it resulted in a new study design, a refutationist approach is bound to have at least a subtle impact on the design, analysis and reporting of a study.
Examples of more subtle differences may be found by contrasting several traditional reports of case-control studies of renal adenocarcinoma 29 ' 30 with similar reports in which the author tried to maintain a refutationist outlook. 3132 In reporting an association with asbestos, 31 raw data on asbestos exposure and hypothesized modifiers were presented so they could be reanalysed by readers with different beliefs about how exposure should be defined. The discussion section was structured as a series of refutations. In an analysis of dietary correlates of renal adenocarcinoma, 32 some elements of 'forward elimination' and sensitivity analysis were used: simple stratified analyses preceded more complex analyses; both energy-adjusted and unadjusted nutrient scores were used; separate contrasts for incident and prevalent cases versus controls were made; both unconditional and conditional logistic regression models were examined; hypotheses concerning selection bias were extensively tested. 16 In retrospect, it was evident that more could have been done to make these studies more refutationist, especially more systematic use of 'forward elimination'. At the time, the connection between deductive logic and multivariate methods was not so clear to the author.
CONCLUSION
As options in multivariate analysis proliferate, epidemiologists will increasingly recognize that data do not speak for themselves; they only respond to interrogation. Data appear to speak for themselves only if the questions we pose are restricted or routine (eg what is the crude relative risk?). The widening of choices in methods of data analysis has so expanded the range of questions we can ask (each combination of model assumptions, data restrictions and controlled variables constituting a different question) that the goal of a single optimum model increasingly appears inappro- '. 33 This is no endorsement for an adversarial approach to science in which winning a dispute becomes more important than integrity. Critics must also use scientific standards 34 -precise and refutable counter-hypotheses, preferably expressed quantitatively. Nevertheless, while the epidemiologist must alternatively take the roles of defence attorney, prosecutor, judge and jury, the latter three are not what distinguish science from non-science. It is the quality of defence that demarcates more from less scientific epidemiology.
